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« The Public will learn that patents are artificial stimuli to 
improvident exertions; that they cheat people by promising what 
they cannot perform;  that they rarely give security to really good 
inventions, and elevate into importance a number of trifles […], no 
possible good can ever come of a Patent Law, however admirably 
it may be framed. » 
 
-The Economist, 1851. 
 
 
 
The XXIth century is auguring a world where production has shifted 
literally from 'hardware' to 'software'. This new economy brings in 
new realities that are difficult to cope with using the traditional tools 
provided by political economy. One of these new realities is the 
importance intellectual property has taken as a form of capitalized 
value. Since it is taken for granted that the market provides the 
optimal allocation of scarce resources, it is considered that by 
commodifying ideas and knowledge, the market will permit the same 
optimal allocation. This assumption was behind the Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) that was negociated and 
ratified during the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, we intend to show 
through a closer on the pharmaceutical industry that the legitimacy of 
the implementation of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) may 
sometimes be disputed. Trade-Related Intellectual Property is not a 
natural right, it is a social construction aiming to ensure the greatest 
social welfare by encroaching the market through provisional 
monopoly rights. In this paper, we will first introduce the theoretical 
aspects of intellectual property rights (IPR) by analysing the different 
elements used to legitimize intellectual property. Second, we will 
show how intellectual property is managed in international trade 
through the international agreement of 1993 on Trade-Related 
intellectual Property (TRIPS). Finally, we will analyse concretely the 
impact of the TRIPS agreement for producers and consumers in the 
pharmaceuticals industry. In our conclusion, we will show how our 
analysis of the pharmaceutical industry allows us to question more 
deeply the justification of intellectual property in terms of economic 
efficiency. 
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THEORY 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) usually refers to three elements: 
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights. In this paper we will focus 
mainly on patents. The existence of IPR is generally justified as a 
palliative to the inherent incapacity of the market to reward 
innovation, be it industrial, intellectual, artistic or commercial. 
Without a doubt, innovation requires important costs in Research and 
Development (R&D). Any useful innovation, if not protected by a 
legal right, can usually be reproduced or copied by others at low cost 
in generic versions. If not protected, the innovation means no 
potential profits for the innovator and will not permit him to 
compensate for the costs entailed in R&D. Because of the presence of 
increasing returns to scale, R&D firms couldn't survive as price takers 
(if output is priced at marginal cost, the R&D firms would not cover 
the cost of developing the technological innovation that gave the firm 
its increasing returns-to-scale "production function") [Fulton, 1997]. 
Hence, without IPR, the market doesn't give any incentive to invest in 
R&D for innovation. IPR are mechanisms put in place by existing 
authorities to guarantee an earning-capacity (a rent) from creative and 
innovative activities by granting a monopoly right to the innovator 
over his realization. IPR have therefore the incentive role for 
innovation by making the private investments in R&D profitable. The 
nature of IPR is not without contradictions; it seeks to compensate the 
deficiencies of the market by granting "legal monopoly rights" (over 
ideas, knowledge and techniques). But granting exclusive rights of 
exploitation also means compensating market deficiencies by 
distorting the market even more. 
IPR is a property right not over a commodity but over capacities of 
production, ideas or informations (fabrication processes, softwares, 
etc.). By securing a greater earning-capacity (higher rent due to 
stronger IPR), the greater will be the incentive to innovate and to 
develop new technologies. Stronger IPR means a faster pace for 
technological progress, contributing more to common welfare. 
Nevertheless, once the innovation exists, the logic is inverted: 
stronger IPR means a greater net loss for the general welfare of the 
community since innovations will be less diffused (the cost to access 
the protected informations being greater). The absence of IPR would 
then mean a greater technological diffusion and a maximal general 
welfare. As the economist Joan Robinson has put it: "The justification 
of the patent system is that by slowing down the diffusion of technical 
progress it ensures that there will be more progress to diffuse" [cited 
in Hettinger, 1989, p.48]. The dilemma over IPR is thus as follows: 
how can we ensure the greatest technological development 
(necessitating stronger IPR) while maximizing technological diffusion 
(necessitating weaker IPR). The duration of patents must be 
determined in a way that maximizes the social welfare of the 
community. In the case of TRIPS, it has been fixed to twenty years. 
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Note that experience shows that the absence of IPR does not 
necessarily mean a greater technological diffusion since firms can 
also maintain a position of technological monopoly by industrial 
secrecy. Some argue, like Thurow [1997], that industrial secrecy is in 
fact a more important constraint to the diffusion of knowledge than 
legal IPR since a patented invention has at least a minimal diffusion 
by the selling of the patent or the selling of licences (right to access 
and use patented informations without appropriating it).  
Different philosophical schemes are used to justify IPR. In his book 
on the Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, May 
introduces three conventional schemata that usually justify IPR: 1-The 
hegelian self-developmental scheme  2-The lockean instrumental 
scheme  3-The economic or pragmatic scheme (by enhancing 
economic productivity) [2000, chap 1 & 2, see also Steidlmeier, 
1993].  
First, for Hegel, an author's ideas are expressions of his self and are 
part of his inalienable development as a sovereign human being; 
private property is thus tied to the liberty and creative self-
development of the individual and refrains the dissolution of the self 
in the collectivity. But we should here remember Marx's critique of 
Hegel's self-developmental scheme through private property: for 
Marx, private property, in a capitalist society, is rather a mean for the 
alienation of the self. Through commodification, the worker's labour 
is robbed of its self-developmental potential for the individual who, 
through private property, is alienated both from the product of labour 
and the productive activity itself. The justification of IPR through the 
hegelian self developmental scheme is thus far from convincing since 
it is still nowadays confronted to the critique that commodification 
causes alienation of the self rather than its realisation.  
Second, U.S. businesses have sometimes presented the lockean 
"fruits of labor" argument in terms of their enterprise. For example, 
according to the industry, it costs approximatively US$ 500 million to 
develop a new drug and bring it to market [Trouiller & Olliaro, 1999]. 
Since pharmaceuticals are easily cloned and the industry is extremely 
affected by pirating, pharmaceutical companies assert that cloning 
unjustly robs them of the "fruits of their labor"; IPR must then be 
implemented in the name of economic justice. However, the lockean 
natural law argument to achieve "economic justice" does not hold 
because of all the problems inherent to this "jusnaturaliste" tradition. 
As Proudhon showed [1840], the natural law of property is based on a 
"Droit d'Aubaine" (Windfall Right) which impedes economic justice. 
Proudhon's argument is that economic justice through appropriation of 
the fruits of his own labor can be achieved only if conditions of 
economic equality exist. Since the appropriation of land by some 
takes away the means of production for others, the lockean natural 
right of property is based on usurpation. The conclusion of Proudhon 
is thus that "All property is theft". Nevertheless, one could agree with 
Fichte [1800] that the instrumental lockean justification of private 
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property holds but only if the means of production are constantly 
redistributed in equal shares between all individuals [see Merle, 
1997]. But Locke himself [1690, chap. 5] never intended to show that 
property through labour was a mean to achieve economic justice but 
was rather a mean to achieve economic efficiency. The claims for 
economic justice are irrelevant for Locke since "a King of a large and 
fruitful territory [in America] feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a 
day labourer in England" [1690, §41]. Usurpation of the fruits of the 
workers' labor is thus justified by economic growth, which benefits to 
all. 
The last justification of IPR brings us back to the argument about 
economic efficiency: how to maximize the social welfare of the 
community? Since the traditional optimization of resources allocation 
is through the market, it is considered that to achieve this economic 
efficiency with ideas and knowledge, we just have to treat knowledge 
as a conventional commodity —as something that is "trade-related"— 
and market efficiency will do the rest. Commodification of knowledge 
thus becomes the way to increase economic growth and consequently 
social welfare. The most convincing argument in favor of TRIPS was 
that conservative estimates showed that if these agreements were 
implemented, it would stimulate world economic growth by adding 
more than US$ 200 billion annually to global output [Maskus, 1994]. 
This justification of IPR in terms of economic efficiency thus seems 
to be the only legitimate one. 
Since the justification in terms of economic efficiency is the only 
one to consider, we can sum up the argumentation justifying the 
existence of IPR in 3 points: 
1- Innovation contributes to economic growth and social welfare  
2- Innovation is costly since it necessitates a lot of investments in 
R&D 
3- IPR permits to compensate for the costs of innovation, ensuring 
more innovation 
Nonetheless, three comments are here necessary. First, we have to 
keep in mind that there is no convincing economic demonstration of 
the superior contribution to social welfare of investments in R&D as 
compared to investments in traditional production. One cannot tell if a 
shift of all investments in R&D to traditional sectors would mean an 
inferior social welfare. One cannot tell quantitatively if the 
enhancement of traditional production at the expense of innovative 
production would mean less social welfare. The only possible 
demonstration is a qualitative one in terms of the bettering of the 
human condition (which is always a subjective interpretation). 
Economists usually agree that prices and profits in the context of pure 
competition are indicators of the contribution to social welfare; as 
Hayek puts it in the Fatal Conceit [1988, p.104]: «Prices and profit 
are all that most producers need to be able to serve more effectively 
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the needs of men they do not know». Nevertheless, the determination 
of prices and profits by granting IPR for innovative firms corresponds 
to the degree of protection granted through IPR and is arbitrarily set 
by the authorities. For this reason, profits cannot be here considered 
as such an indicator. 
Second, we must look more closely at the cost of innovation. We 
can agree that innovation proves to be costly. For example, the 
biotechnology industry ploughs some 45% of its annual income into 
R&D [Moise, 1999]. However, since knowledge is incremental, we 
must keep in mind that the greatest cost in R&D is the cost to access 
existing patented knowledge. One could argue with May [2000, p.53] 
that the acceleration of innovation could make a case against the role 
of intellectual property: « Technological innovation reached a critical 
mass because ideas were widely available, not because they were 
scarce, expensive and well protected ». 
Finally, we must keep in mind that a great part of R&D is financed 
by public funds. Private firms sometimes get a patent on knowledge 
generated in its greatest part from public source. In 1990, from US$ 
149.7 billions spent in R&D in the U.S., the industry spent US$ 73.95 
billion, US$ 69.2 billion came from government sources while 
universities and other institutions contributed for US$ 6.7 billion 
[Steidlmeier & Falbe, 1994]. In 1996, a study showed [cited by 
Thurow, 1997] that "73% of private patents were based on knowledge 
generated from public sources such as universities and non-profit or 
government laboratories." 
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IPR IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
The importance of IPR in international trade is difficult to measure 
since we find no valid economic indicators of traded IPR value. 
Official statistics usually show the U.S. superiority in terms of 
absolute number of patents registered every year but we find very few 
indications about their value in foreign trade. Still, OECD provides 
some statistics on the trends of the knowledge composition of world-
trade.            
TABLE 1 
OECD Classification of Manufacturing Industries Based 
on Technology 
Technology 
level 
Industries 
High industries Aircraft; Office & computing equipment; Drugs & 
medicines 
(pharmaceuticals); Radio, TV & communication equipment 
Medium-
High 
Professional goods; Motor vehicles; Electrical machines 
excluding (comm. equip.); Chemicals (excluding drugs); 
Other transport; Non-electrical machinery 
Medium-Low Rubber & plastic products; Shipbuilding & repairing; Other 
manufacturing; Non-ferrous metals; Non-metallic mineral 
Low Paper, products & printing; Textiles; apparel & leather; 
Food, 
beverages & tobacco; Wood products & furniture. 
Source: OECD, 1997 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Average Composition of Manufactured Exports by 
Technology Level, for OECD (per cent) 
 1980-1984 1990-1994 
High 11.7 16.2 
Medium-High 44.1 46.1 
Medium-low 23.4 17.8 
Low 19.9 19.3 
Source: OECD 1997 
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We must keep in mind that IPR have proliferated quickly in all 
spheres of production since the ratification of TRIPS in December 
1993 by the end of the Uruguay Round. For example, even 
agricultural products now contain some degree of IPR (the example of 
Monsanto and their genetically modified seeds is well known). Even 
if IPR may constitute only a little portion of the added value of a 
good, we must remember that IPR means net earnings (a net margin of 
profit) since this added value usually doesn't cost anything to 
reproduce. 
The Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS), 
implemented with the Marrakech agreements, which gave also birth to 
the WTO, introduces a global minimum standard (historically based 
on the standards of developed countries) for the protection of 
intellectual property, including those of pharmaceuticals. The 
standard introduced by TRIPS establishes the supremacy of the rights 
of individuals on intellectual property over collective rights. TRIPS is 
only a minimum standard since a state can choose to implement even 
stricter IPR laws but only if compatible with TRIPS standard and key 
principles of the WTO: national treatment, most favoured nation 
treatment and reciprocity. TRIPS provides transitional periods during 
which the different countries are required to bring their national 
standards to the level requested in TRIPS: developed countries had 
until 1996, developing countries had until 2000 (2005 for developing 
countries who never introduced patents before TRIPS), and 2006 for 
the least developed countries.  
The ratification of the TRIPS by developing countries came as a 
surprise since they never favoured this kind of agreement. They 
argued that any agreement based on the supremacy of private rights 
over collective rights benefits only developed countries (capable of 
innovation) while endangering their means of development1. In fact, it 
makes little sense for developing countries to "protect" R&D 
investments that simply do not exist in their countries. By increasing 
consumption prices with IPR protection, they are just facilitating 
foreign profit making at the expense of domestic consumers. As 
explains Maskus [1994, p.81]: 
« Each country's interests in such policies depends on a host of national 
characteristics, including its innovative capacity, its ability to absorb 
foreign technology, and its preference for quality in consumption. Within 
each country innovative firms would gain from harmonization, while users 
                                                     
1 Another surprising point about the ratification of TRIPS is that there was no 
parallel ratification of an "Antitrust Legislation Agreement". WTO is thus granting 
monopoly rights without having a legislation to bound monopolies. The antitrust 
legislation has been relegated to the national level. But as notes Marschall [1997], 
most countries don't have the ressources to implement such antitrust legislations. For 
example, the antitrust case with Microsoft in the U.S. necessitated, in 1994-1995, 14 
000 attorney-hours, 5500 paralegal-hours, 3650 economist-hours and roughly one 
million pages of document; and the U.S. had to go over the whole process again in 
1999. This kind of ressources is far from available in most countries, making 
national antitrust policies usually totally uneffective. 
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of products will suffer higher costs. Overall, highly innovative countries 
would gain, while poorer countries would experience net losses. » 
The Economist [2001] arrives to the same conclusion: 
"Governments of poor countries are being asked to co-operate in a 
redistribution of global income that will cost them hundred of 
millions of dollars". During TRIPS negotiations, developing countries 
wanted to maintain the existing international conventions on IPR 
(namely with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)) 
since they had a larger margin of manoeuvre to adapt national IPR 
legislations to national interest. The position of the government of 
India in his official papers presented in Uruguay Round talks reflected 
the flexibility reclaimed by developing countries [cited in Steidlmeier, 
1993]: 
« The essence of the  intellectual property protection system is its 
monopolistic and restrictive character; its purpose is not to "liberalise," 
but to conferexclusive rights on their owners. Recognising the 
extraordinary implicationsof the system, international conventions on this 
subject incorporate, asa central philosophy, the freedom of the member 
states to attune theirintellectual property protection system to their own, 
needs and conditions. This fundamental principle should inform and guide 
of the discussions theNegotiating Group on the intellectual property 
protection system. » 
The traditional position of developing countries was that individual 
claims on intellectual property should be subordinated to more 
fundamental claims of social well-being. IPR shouldn't be an 
inalienable right, it should be a limited private right subordinated to 
greater interests; namely the right of a people to livelihood. For India 
and other developing countries, the principles which govern 
intellectual property should be relative to their socio-economic, 
developmental, technological and public interest priorities and to their 
needs as developing countries. India's position was followed by a set 
of very concrete propositions [Steidlmeier, 1993]: 1-patents must be 
fully worked (or exploited) in the host country  2-licensing of rights 
may be made compulsory 3-certain areas can be excluded from 
patentability for ethical reasons (namely food, pharmaceuticals, 
agricultural chemicals and biogenetic innovations). 
TRIPS reflects mostly the interests of developed countries by 
implementing strong IPR protection based on the standards of the 
United States. In fact, the United States account for 40.6% of global 
spending in R&D [Economist, 2002]. TRIPS fails to recognise that 
there are perfectly legitimate reasons for different calculations of the 
socially optimal length of time for protecting a patent. Its ratification 
by the developing countries was therefore unanticipated by a lot of 
people. Some consider that developing countries joined TRIPS in 
exchange of some trading advantages from developed countries but 
also because they were subject to a lot of pressures. Let us remind 
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that the U.S. implemented the Special 301 clause2 at the same time 
they started pushing to include TRIPS in the Uruguay Round. Another 
fact that could explain partly the acceptation of TRIPS by developing 
countries is the inclusion of a get-out clause (Article 31, reproduced 
in the appendix) which permits compulsory licensing and parallel 
imports (but only under strict conditions). Nevertheless, the United 
States has adopted a TRIPS+ point of view where TRIPS is 
considered as a minimal standard and all countries are encouraged 
(strongly) to implement even stricter IPR laws. Hence, the legal use 
by a country of Article 31, even when justified, is usually followed by 
an inscription on the Special 301 Watch list by the U.S.; which is 
usually a prelude to trade sanctions. In fact, just appearing on the list 
is a form of sanction because it discourages investments, turning a 
country's business sector and commerce ministry against generic 
production using compulsory licensing, forcing local officials to 
concede to U.S. demands by getting back in line [Rosenberg, 2001]. 
Note that the predominance of the interests of developed countries 
in TRIPS is also clearly illustrated in the article 34, which reverses 
the burden of proof for process patents from the plaintive to the 
defendant:  
« Article 34. Process patents: Burden of proof. For the purposes of civil 
proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner […] 
if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the 
judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove 
that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the 
patented process» 
Since it is assumed that most legal disputes over process patents 
will be between firms holding IPR in developed countries and generic 
firms in developing countries, the burden of proof will then rest on 
the shoulders of the latter. TRIPS may be considered as one of the 
very first contemporary legal framework where the presumption of 
innocence is no more. 
 
                                                     
2 The Special 301 clause, implemented as the Section 1303 of Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, is a broad interpretation of the section 301 of the 1974 
U.S. Trade Act. It allows the U.S. Trade Representative to sanction unilaterally 
countries regarded as engaging in "unfair" trade practices. The clause is designed to 
enhance the United States' ability to negociate improvements in foreign intellectual 
property regimes [See Grier, 2002]. Note that the "Special 301", just as the "Super 
301", implements a watchlist where the US Trade Representative identifies the 
"priority foreign countries" that deny "adequate and effective" protection of IPR or 
"fair and equitable market access" to US persons relying upon IPR protection. The 
countries put on the watchlist are investigated to determine if unilateral trade 
sanctions by the United States are necessary. However, for any country, to be put on 
the watchlist causes foreign investments to flee the country just in case of American 
sanctions. To be put on the list is a sanction in itself. 
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IPR IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
Patents are crucial in the pharmaceutical industry which has been 
particularly active in the lobbying for implementing TRIPS. Annual 
world sales of drugs amount to about US$ 400 billion [McNeil, 2000]. 
Production rests on a cleavage between patent holding multinational 
pharmaceutical giants (the most well-known being Pfizer, Bayer, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithkline, Wyeth, Merck, Novartis, 
Aventis, Johnson & Johnson, Roche, Schering-Plough) and generics 
firms in developing countries (especially in India, Brazil, Argentina, 
Thailand, Egypt and China). Table 3 indicates the origin of patents 
over the most important medicines since 1975. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
 
To avoid the cost of patents held in developed countries, some 
developing countries resort to generic production. Note that generics 
are not illegal since most developing countries patent legislations 
normally do not include patents over products but only over 
production processes; reverse engineering is thus possible and so is 
the generic production and the commercialization of those products. 
Since most developing countries do not have to adapt their patent law 
to TRIPS standards before 2005, generic production cannot be 
sanctioned in those countries until then. It is only when generic drugs 
are sold in countries where a patent has not yet expired (without 
recourse to Article 31 of TRIPS) that a "generics manufacturer" 
becomes a "pirate counterfeiter" [McNeil, 2000]. 
 IPR protected drugs are usually unaffordable for most patients (or 
"consumers") in developing countries. For example, 95% of people 
infected with HIV worldwide live in the world's poorest countries. 
Since effective treatments are patent protected, the result is that the 
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annual cost to treat a single patient with AIDS is up to 100 times the 
average GDP per capita in developing countries [Schull, 2000]. A 
generic drug is usually 80% to 98% cheaper than the corresponding 
IPR protected drug. In most countries, access to essential medicines 
thus means producing or importing generic drugs.  
The amount of losses due to such drug counterfeiting is in dispute. 
Some executives claim that Western pharmaceutical manufacturers 
are losing at least US$ 40 billion every year. But we must keep in 
mind that Western pharmaceutical manufacturers would sell very little 
in the developing world at the price they charge in U.S. or Europe. 
Harvey E. Bale Jr., director general of the International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Associations, a Geneva-based trade 
association, estimates the lost sales at about US$ 3 billion [McNeil, 
2000]. However, the pharmaceutical industry is ranked as the world's 
most profitable (See Table 4). 
 
           TABLE 4 
Top Five Most Profitable Industries Worldwide, 1996 
Rank Industry Median return 
on revenues 
(%) 
Industry Median return 
on assets (%) 
1 Pharmaceuticals  17.1 Pharmaceuticals 13.8 
2 Diversified 
financials 
10.6 Telecoms 6.8 
3 Telecoms  10.1 Food 6.7 
4 Beverages  6.1 Beverages 6.0 
5 Chemicals 5.1 Specialist retailers 5.1 
Source: Fortune, 4 August 1997, F-29 – F-30. 
 
 
As shown by the Public Citizen [April 2001], the drug industry's 
success in the Fortune 500 profitability rankings has become a rite of 
spring. In the 1970s and 1980s, profitability of Fortune 500 drug 
companies (measured by return on revenues) was two times greater 
than the median for all industries in the Fortune 500. In the 1990s the 
drug industry's profitability was almost four times greater than the 
median for all industries in the Fortune 500. 
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturer of America 
(PhRMA), an industry lobby group, argues that "we need to be 
profitable in order to attract the capital to sustain innovation" [cited 
in McNeil, 2000]. This argument is being criticized both 
pragmatically and historically. Pragmatically, according to the data of 
the Fortune Magazine, the Fortune 500 drug companies dedicated in 
2000 12% of their revenues to R&D while dedicating 17% to profits 
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and 30% to marketing and administration [see Public Citizen, April 
2001]. Historically, for organisations like the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), this argument does not hold for 
developing countries [MSF & al., 1999]: 
« Among the 1223 new chemical entities commercialized from 1975 to 
1997, […] only 13 (1%) are specifically for tropical diseases. A close 
analysis of these results shows that 2 out of those 13 drugs are actually 
updated versions of previous products, 2 are the result of military 
research, 5 come from veterinary research and only 4 (0.3%) may be 
considered as direct results of R&D activities of the pharmaceutical 
industry. » 
The actual profit-driven system of innovation seems unable to meet 
current and evolving social needs of the poorer populations. R&D 
focus on the most profitable pathologies, namely heart diseases, 
cancer, AIDS but also "comfort illnesses" like obesity, impotence or 
pilosity [Losson, 2000].  For example, it has been known for more 
than ten years that eflornithine is an actual "miracle cure" for sleeping 
sickness which infects 300 000 people each year and kills 150 000. 
However, stocks have run out because early hopes that it would help 
fight cancer have dashed and production stopped abruptly because 
judged unprofitable. Though, production has resumed since it was 
discovered that eflornithine could help remove facial hair3.  
Furthermore, as notes MSF, competition between pharmaceutical 
companies over high rates of profit is such that investments in 
promotion and publicity are usually greater than investments in R&D 
[cited in Losson, 2000]. Another argument against the "necessity" of 
high profits in order to attract more capital concerns the sources of 
financing for R&D. Even PhRMA estimates that private industry 
finances only about 43% of drug development [cited in Schull, 2000]. 
Especially if we look at patents on an individual basis, some seem 
clearly unjustified since they are private appropriation of researches 
mostly resulting of public funds. For example, five commonly used 
drugs against AIDS (didanosine, lamivudine, nevirapine, staduvine 
and zidovudine (AZT)) were financed by taxpayers and not by 
shareholders (those are the drugs the most in dispute actually between 
patent holders and developing countries who try to find alternative 
generic supply). The actual high price of around US$ 10 000 for a 
year's triple therapy (cocktail of medicines against AIDS) is hardly 
justifiable. As Pierre Chirac & al. [2000] explain: 
« Zidovudine was first synthesized in 1964. Most of the research that 
showed the drug effectiveness as an antiretroviral was done by the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health. Nevertheless, Glaxo Wellcome [merged in 
                                                     
3 Bristol-Myers Squibb in association with Gilette announced in February 2001 that 
they would use the compound in a new facial cream, Vaniqa. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and MSF is close to an agreement for the companies to make an 
injectable form to treat sleeping sickness [McNeil, 2001]. 
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1999 with SmithKline Beecham to form GlaxoSmithkline], having 
obtained the patent for zidovudine for the treatment of AIDS, brought the 
drug onto the market in 1987 as one of the most expensive ever sold. 13 
years later, the drug remains unaffordable for most people with AIDS. 
They will have to wait another 5 years before the patent expires.» 
But whatever may be the origin of existing patents, all 
pharmaceuticals firms have a direct interest to enforce the IPR 
conferred by held patents. With TRIPS, pharmaceuticals firms have 
now access to an international legal framework to impose disciplinary 
measures to enforce their rights as owners of knowledge. Medicines 
thus have become the theatre of different international disputes where 
pharmaceuticals firms try to implement a narrow and strict 
interpretation of their IPR to force "contravening" countries to 
discontinue production of generics. Developing countries represent a 
very low portion of the pharmaceuticals market (the whole African 
continent represents less than 1%). However, the endeavour to 
discipline the states is less a question of profit than a question of 
"principle" for the pharmaceutical industry: future earnings must be 
secured through the establishment of a strict legal framework. Any 
pattern where a country could use generics is interpreted as dangerous 
for the whole system; it is a threat to the business model. Thus, while 
some developing countries try to access cheaper essential medicines 
by resorting to Article 31 of TRIPS in order to use the provision of 
compulsory licensing, the pharmaceutical industry has deployed all 
necessary measures to enforce its rights.  
The way the American pharmaceutical industry structured its 
lobbying is quite impressive. Organized around the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturer of America (PhRMA), an industry lobby 
group, the different pharmaceuticals giants manage to voice their 
interests very well in the American political arena. In 1998, 
pharmaceutical companies spent more than US$ 77 millions on 
lobbying in the United States (a level surpassed only by the tobacco 
industry) [Hoffmann, 1999]. But they spent more than any other 
industry in 1999-2000 by spending $262 million on political influence 
during the election cycle, that is $177 million on lobbying, $65 
million on issue ads and $20 million on campaign contributions. The 
industry hired 625 different lobbyists in 2000 (or more than one 
lobbyist for every member of Congress). More than half the 625 hired 
lobbyists were either former members of Congress (21) or others who 
previously worked in Congress or in other federal government 
positions (295). It is thus not surprising that the Clinton and Bush 
administrations have been very receptive to the demands of that 
industry. In fact, only two countries adopted a hardline position (the 
TRIPS+ approach) concerning international patent laws: United States 
and Switzerland.  
Note that among the 100 world largest firms in any industry, 14 are 
pharmaceutical giants according to the 2001 FT Global 500. Among 
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those 14 giants, 10 are based in the United States while 2 are based in 
Switzerland [see Table 5 below]. 
               TABLE 5 
PHARMACEUTICAL GIANTS AMONG THE WORLD LARGEST 100 
FIRMS ACCORDING TO THE FT GLOBAL 500, 2001 
FIRM COUNTRY MARKET CAPITAL 
(US$M) 
RANK 
Pfizer United States 263 996 4 
Merck United States 195 743 13 
GlaxoSmithkline United Kingdom 160 406 19 
Johnson & Johnson United States 135 007 24 
Novartis Switzerland 123 428 26 
Bristol Myers Squibb United States 123 310 27 
Eli Lilly United States 91 450 42 
Roche Switzerland 87 013 48 
Schering-Plough United States 76 340 58 
American Home 
Products (now Wyeth) 
United States 73 496 63 
Pharmacia United States 71 895 65 
Abbott Laboratories United States 66 116 72 
Amgen United States 65 291 73 
Aventis France 57 146 86 
 
The United States have been particularly active in defending the 
interests of the pharmaceutical lobbies by promoting a hardline for the 
respect of pharmaceutical patents. Armed with a whole range of 
unilateral trade sanctions, the United States, since the Uruguay 
Round, constantly maintained the pressure to "discipline" the 
contravening countries producing generic medecines. But the 
pharmaceutical industry also puts pressure using other means at its 
disposal. The different events surrounding AIDS medecines in 
developing countries can be used as an illustration of the disciplinary 
power of pharmaceutical firms to increase their profit margins. In the 
following lines, we analyze briefly four concrete cases where 
pharmaceutical industry attempted to discipline "contravening" 
countries. 
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Thailand: 
One and a half million out of 61 million Thais are infected with 
HIV. The monthly price for AIDS cocktails is US$ 675 whereas the 
typical monthly wage of an office-worker is US$ 120 [Wilson & al., 
1999]. In 1992, Thailand was forced to implement a new Patent Act 
under the threat of unilateral trade Sanctions by the United States. In 
September 1992, the Thai Supreme Court issued a report entitled 
"National Experience on Judiciary and Intellectual Property System". 
It stated that "Thailand is not ready to change and improve the level 
of (pharmaceutical) patent protection," in other words, to move from 
the Act of 1979 which "intends to protect the public" to the new Act 
of 1992 which "aims to protect the inventors." However, Thailand has 
been forced by "countries who own technologies of producing 
pharmaceutical products to improve patent law for the exchange of 
trade benefits." Two weeks later, contrary to the recommendations of 
the Thai Supreme Court, the new Patent Act was implemented. Still, 
the Thai government, in harmony with its new patent law and Article 
31 of TRIPS, allowed the production of generic versions of AIDS 
related drugs. In 1998, Thai pharmaceutical companies managed to 
produce legally generic versions of fluconazole, a drug for the 
treatment of cryptococcal meningitis (a fatal disease often associated 
with AIDS). The price of flucozanole, formerly manufactured locally 
only by Pfizer at the price of 12 000 baths (around US$ 330) for a 
pack of 50 tablets, dropped to 4000 baths a pack. Pfizer alerted the 
US government to intervene in the matter. U.S. put Thailand on the 
Special 301 list and threatened Thai authorities that it would impose a 
duty on their main exports (timber, jewellery, microprocessors) if 
they did not stop making fluconazole [Bulard, 2000]. The U.S. market 
represents 25% of Thai exports. Six months after the beginning of 
generic production, sales of generic fluconazole were banned in 
Thailand. The case of Thailand is a striking example of how the US 
bypassed WTO agreements to protect its drug companies [Boseley, 
1999]. 
 
Ghana: 
In sub-Saharan Africa, 25 million people are infected with HIV. At 
the beginning of 2000, a pharmaceutical distributor in Ghana 
purchased from Cipla (India's most famous generic firm) a small 
consignment of Duovir, a generic version of Combivir (a combination 
of two principal AIDS drugs). Combivir is patented by the giant 
Glaxo-Wellcome. Glaxo moved aggressively in Ghana to force the 
suspension of the sale. In letters sent to Cipla, Glaxo threatened the 
Indian generic drug producer with lawsuits if it continued to export to 
Ghana. In its letter, Glaxo said four patents issued by the African 
Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO) provide exclusive 
marketing rights to its drug in Ghana. However, the ARIPO replied 
against Glaxo showing that the patents are in fact invalid in Ghana 
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since they were issued at a time when Ghana didn't provide patent 
protection to pharmaceuticals. As said an ARIPO spokesman: "if 
[Glaxo officials] went to court they would lose" [cited in Schoofs, 
2000]. To avoid judicial procedures, Cipla stopped selling Duovir in 
Ghana. 
  
Brazil: 
Brazil is often depicted as a model in the fight against AIDS in 
developing countries [Rosenberg, 2001]. Brazil's government provides 
a state of the art treatment to anybody infected with HIV by 
distributing freely antiretroviral drugs (many of which are produced 
generically by Brazilian companies). In 1994, the World Bank 
estimated that by 2000 Brazil would have 1.2 million HIV-positive 
people; recent surveys showed that about only 530 000 people are 
infected. The Health Ministry spent US$ 444 million on AIDS drugs 
in 2000 (4% of its budget). The savings in terms of hospitalizations is 
estimated to US$ 422 million for the period from 1997 to 1999 (the 
savings in terms of halving the expected infection rates and in terms 
of productivity are not taken into account). In his article on the 
Brazilian model, Rosenberg concludes by praising Brazil for having 
understood the importance of generics [2001]:  
" AIDS can become a manageable disease in the third world, but it takes 
power, in addition to other things. The ability to pull the price of AIDS drugs 
within reach of those who need them may someday come from the backing of 
some international organization, or the pharmaceutical industry might find 
religion. But at the moment, it arises only from the threat to make or buy 
generic drugs. AIDS is turning the third world's human landscape into a 
parched wasteland. Brazil has shown that, armed with the power of 
competition, a government can do more than sit and watch the desert 
encroach. ".  
At the beginning of January 2001, Washington complained at the 
WTO that Brazil was violating TRIPS agreement by granting 
compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals not produced in the national 
boundaries at least three years after the apparition of the drug. Article 
68 of Brazil's Patent Law  permits compulsory licensing to address (1) 
abuse of patent rights, (2) abuses of economic power and (3) failure 
by the patent holder to supply the needs of the domestic market. In the 
beginning of February, the WTO agreed to set up a panel to review 
the case. But with public attention mobilized in 2001 in favour of 
access to essential medecines due to the very mediatized lawsuit of 
pharmaceuticals giants against South Africa, the United States 
withdrew their complaint June 25, 2001 after an agreement with 
Brazil to use the newly created bilateral Consultative Mechanism to 
promote cooperation on HIV/AIDS and address WTO patent dispute. 
Brazil always maintained that Article 68 was fully consistent with the 
TRIPS agreement. 
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South Africa: 
4.7 million South Africans are infected by HIV. In 2000 alone, 250 
000 people died of HIV/AIDS.  Infecting one South African adult out 
of five, HIV is considered as a threat to national productivity and 
development by the 1999 African Competitiveness Report. Following 
the end of Apartheid in 1994, the South African government inherited 
an health sector representing the racial divide. On one hand, a private 
health sector made up with advanced medical facilities and highly 
paid doctors that serves 20% of the population and accounts for 80% 
of national spending on medicines. On the other hand, the public 
health sector that serves 80% of the population but accounts for only 
20% of national spending on medicines.  
The new South African Constitution stipulates that "Everyone has 
the right to have access to health care services" [cited in MSF, 2001]. 
In 1997, the Mandela government passed the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act (Act 90 of 1997) to help realise 
this constitutional duty by setting a marketplace for medicines based 
on affordable prices. The amendment relies on Article 31 of TRIPS 
and resorts to generic medicines and parallel imports to lower the 
costs of treatments. However, PhRMA, an industry group based in the 
U.S., labelled the legislation "piracy" [cited in Vulliamy, 1999]. 
South Africa was immediately put on the "Special 301 Watch list" by 
the U.S.. On April 1998, Congressman Rodney Frelinghuysen of New 
Jersey (where Bristol-Myers is based) even introduced a provision 
into the Foreign Operations Bill to cut off all aid to South Africa until 
Mandela's proposals were dropped. U.S. dropped the sanctions threats 
in September 1999 but the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association 
of South Africa, backed by 38 giants of pharmaceuticals [see 
appendix 2], had already launched a lawsuit against the South African 
government (blocking de facto the implementation of the bill) arguing 
that Act 90 was, among others, incompatible with TRIPS. After a 
three years delay (the bill still blocked), the case was heard in the 
Pretoria High Court from March 5 to 13, 2001. But the lawsuit was 
extremely mediatized and the public started to consider the 
pharmaceutical giants as bad guys feeding on the death toll of poor 
people to increase their profit margins. To say the least, the lawsuit 
was a fiasco in terms of public relations for the drug giants. The 
South African case set an important precedent in the jurisprudence of 
IPR in pharmaceuticals since April 19 2001, Drug giants dropped the 
charges and recognized the right of the South African Government to 
provide cheap AIDS-related medicines if some amendments were 
included in Act 90. The South African government agreed to the 
demands.  
Those four examples show an evolution toward a softening of the 
American position following the different scandals over the access to 
essential medecines. In fact, in the debate over how to interpret the 
TRIPS agreement (a TRIPS+ approach or an Article 31 oriented 
approach), it seems that the Article 31 oriented approach gained the 
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advantage due to a worldwide public awareness surrounding the 
problems entailed in developing countries with TRIPS. The 
predominance of the Article 31 oriented approach of TRIPS was 
confirmed in November 2001 with the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS agreements and the Public Health by the ministerial 
conference of the World Trade Organization [See appendix 3]. 
Especially Paragraph 4 of the Declaration confirms the adoption of 
the Article 31 oriented approach by the members of the WTO:  
« 4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, 
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that 
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we 
reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in 
the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose. » 
But Article 31 concerns only the recourse to mandatory licensing 
for national production. One major problem thus subsists since most 
of the needing countries do not have the capacities to produce the 
medecines themselves (the WTO acknowledges this problem in 
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration and affirms their will to find a 
solution). Therefore, the problem is far from being solved to the 
developing countries' satisfaction. Nevertheless, The Doha 
Declaration can be considered as a spectacular U-turn of the 
American position. 
There are at least two major reasons why the United States and the 
drug giants backed off from their original position. First, the anthrax 
crisis that followed the September 11 attacks. The United States 
threatened Bayer, producer of Cipro (used against anthrax), that they 
would produce a generic version of the drug if the company didn't 
accept to grant a substantial rebate. After this successful blackmail, it 
became impossible for the United States to oppose the assertion of 
other States of the primacy of the right to health before the right of 
patents. 
The second reason is the implementation of a new strategy by the 
drug firms to differentiate prices between countries. With the disaster 
in terms of public relations because of the lawsuit against South 
Africa, drug giants started pushing for price differentiation between 
countries; a practice less controversial to the public eye since it 
reduces the price of drugs in developing countries but a practice that 
goes against existing anti-trust laws. The World Health Organization 
(WHO), criticized by many to be too close of the pharmaceutical 
industry [see Motchane, 2002], backed up those propositions. In May 
2000, the WHO announced that they reached an agreement with the 
pharmaceuticals companies to lower the price of AIDS medicines in 
"qualifying" developing countries. Six months later, nothing had been 
done since the agreement was incompatible with existing anti-trust 
laws. In February 2001, only Senegal, Uganda and Rwanda had 
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reached an agreements with the multinationals (the price of AIDS 
related drugs dropped by 85%). Country-by-country negotiations (and 
firm-by-firm negociations) continue for pharmaceuticals companies to 
reduce the price of AIDS related drugs according to the income level 
of the country. In March 2001, while the trial started against South 
Africa, the drug majors chose to improve their public  image by 
offering some African countries to supply them with drugs even at 
cost-price. But all "gentlemen's agreements" are conditional to the 
goodwill of the firms. However, for drug giants, the implementation 
of such price-differentiation according to income levels seems the 
long-term solution to supply essential medicines, it can be interpreted 
as their new long-term strategy. By granting pharmaceuticals giants 
the possibility of price differentiation (which is contrary to anti-trusts 
laws), they are granted the possibility to determine the price to 
maximize profits in each country. One needs to understand that the 
demand for drugs is very inelastic. Drugs are not everyday products; 
for the "consumer" it can be a matter of life or death so he can be 
ready to give everything he has to get it. Price differentiation, by 
setting the "optimal price" according to income levels makes sure that 
consumers will do so. Note that the WHO agreed only in May 2002 to 
a resolution designed to "give access to essential medecines". The 
resolution asks the WHO director to favour measures to promote price 
differentiation. Price differentiation is more and more perceived as 
the institutionnal long term solution to harmonize the access to 
essential medecines with a high rate of profits for the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 We saw that the only possible legitimation of intellectual property 
was in terms of economic efficiency. Still, even this justification is 
very problematic. The case of pharmaceuticals allows us to identify 
two deeper problems. First, since national contexts are different, 
implementing a universal standard for protecting intellectual property 
as an inalienable right fails to recognize that national differences may 
demand different types of management of IPR legislations. TRIPS 
fails to recognise that there are perfectly legitimate reasons for 
different calculations of the degree of protection of IPR. IPR 
legislations were created to settle an optimal framework according to 
the social needs of the community; but by granting the supremacy of 
private rights over social rights, IPR can lead to abuse under certain 
conditions.  
Second, the justification in terms of economic efficiency, through 
the contribution to social welfare, hides another problem: how can we 
measure economic efficiency? It can only be determined in terms of 
economic growth, in terms of accumulation of wealth. But what is 
wealth? Economists can only measure wealth in terms of value. 
Hence, a greater value created implies greater wealth and thus greater 
contributions to social welfare. This idea is the basic legitimation 
used in the economic discourse (be it neoclassical or marxist). The 
case of pharmaceuticals unveils a real problem. In their undertaking to 
discipline the market by doing away with generics and selling 
pharmaceuticals at higher prices (and by differentiating prices 
according to income levels), pharmaceuticals giants are capable of 
increasing the general price level of drugs in developing countries. 
Higher prices mean less consumption; but since the demand for 
pharmaceuticals has generally been very inelastic, the general 
decrease of demand is less than proportional to its increase in price. 
The result is that with the legal framework instituted by TRIPS, the 
overall value of drugs sold in developing countries is increasing while 
the quantity of drugs produced is decreasing. Economic growth is 
observed since there is accumulation of wealth in terms of value; but 
this accumulation of value is made by refraining of the overall 
production. Traditional analytical tools of political economy are 
unable to provide us here a good indicator for the economic 
contribution to social welfare in a particular sector. The legitimation 
of IPR in terms of economic efficiency thus falls apart. 
If economic efficiency is determined by economic growth being the 
accumulation of value, theoritically IPR in pharmaceuticals really 
contribute to economic efficiency since it creates value. In practice, 
however, it is rather a net loss for the social welfare. Orthodox 
economics consider that « profit are all that most producers need to be 
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able to serve more effectively the needs of men they do not know » 
[Hayek, 1988, p.104]. Nevertheless, this assumption of the invisible 
hand where everyone contributes more to society by following his 
self-interest than by any other way just cannot be applied in the case 
of IPR. If the case of pharmaceuticals shows one thing, it is that 
profits have less to do with "serviciability to the community" than 
with political and economic power to coerce others and to induce 
dearth. Profitability depends less on the capacity to produce than on 
the capacity to control and refrain that capacity to produce. By 
settling a universal minimum to IPR in every WTO-member countries, 
TRIPS fails to recognize that the level of IPR can only be the result of 
a pragmatic political decision taken in accordance with the needs and 
the welfare of a community. One could rather argue that TRIPS is 
only an American strategy to discipline other countries so to ensure a 
favorable world income redistribution. 
Some can argue that, even if a temporary redistribution of global 
income from developing to developed countries will occur, stronger 
IPR protection in developing countries will create better incentives 
for local development of new ideas. And the more important the 
reforms in favour of strong IPR, the bigger the gains in the long run 
for developing countries. Meanwhile, the WHO estimates that in 2020 
there will be half a billion people infected with HIV/AIDS. Maybe it 
is time to remember what Keynes once said to criticize dogmatic 
liberal economists who considered that laissez-faire was more 
efficient in the long-run: "In the long-run, we're all be dead". 
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APPENDIX 1  
TRIPS:  AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCLUDING TRADE IN 
COUNTERFEIT GOODS 
ARTICLE 30 
Exceptions to Rights Conferred 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.  
ARTICLE 31 
Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following 
provisions shall be respected:  
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;  
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has 
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a 
Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, 
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of 
public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without 
making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a 
valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall 
be informed promptly;  
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which 
it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be 
for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial 
or administrative process to be anti-competitive.  
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;  
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or 
goodwill which enjoys such use;  
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use;  
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of 
the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and 
when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. 
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The competent authority shall have the authority to review, upon motivated 
request, the continued existence of these circumstances;  
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of 
each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization;  
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use 
shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct 
higher authority in that Member;  
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use 
shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct 
higher authority in that Member;  
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in sub- 
paragraphs (b) and (f) above where such use is permitted to remedy a practice 
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti- competitive. The 
need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in 
determining the amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities 
shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorization if and when the 
conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur;  
(l) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent ("the 
second patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent 
("the first patent"), the following additional conditions shall apply:  
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an important 
technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the 
invention claimed in the first patent;  
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on 
reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and  
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non- assignable 
except with the assignment of the second patent. 
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APPENDIX 2 
DRUG COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THE LAWSUIT AGAINST 
SOUTH AFRICA: 
 
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa 
Alcon Laboratories (S.A.) (Proprietary) Limited 
Bayer (Proprietary) Limited 
Bristol-Myers Squibb (Proprietary) Limited 
Byk Madaus (Proprietary) Limited 
Eli Lilly (South Africa) (Proprietary) Limited 
Glaxo Wellcome (South Africa) (Proprietary) Limited 
Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited 
Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (Proprietary) Limited 
Janssen-Cilag Pharmaceutica (Proprietary) Limited 
Knoll Pharmaceuticals South Africa (Proprietary) Limited 
Lundbeck South Africa (Proprietary) Limited 
Merck (Proprietary) Limited 
MSD (Proprietary) Limited 
Novartis South Africa (Proprietary) Limited 
Novo Nordisk (Proprietary) Limited 
Pharmacia & Upjohn (Proprietary) Limited 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer South Africa (Proprietary) Limited 
Roche Products (Proprietary) Limited 
Schering (Proprietary) Limited 
Schering-Plough (Proprietary) Limited 
S.A. Scientific Pharmaceuticals (Proprietary) Limited 
SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (Proprietary) Limited 
Universal Pharmaceuticals (Proprietary) Limited 
Wyeth (Proprietary) Limited 
Xixia Pharmaceuticals (Proprietary) Limited 
Zeneca South Africa (Proprietary) Limited 
Bayer AG 
Boehringer-Ingelheim International GmbH 
Boehringer-Ingelheim KG 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 
Byk Gulden Lomberg Chemische Fabrik GmbH 
Dr. Karl Thomae GmbH 
Eli Lilly and Company 
F. Hoffman-La Roche AG 
Merck KgaA 
Merck & Co., Inc. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer S.A. 
SmithKline Beecham 
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APPENDIX 3: 
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
Adopted on 14 November 2001 at Doha Ministerial Conference 
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.  
2. We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to be part of the wider national 
and international action to address these problems. 
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the 
development of new medicines. We also recognize the concerns about its 
effects on prices. 
4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while 
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all. 
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, 
the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this 
purpose. 
5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, while maintaining our 
commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities 
include: 
In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, 
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object 
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and 
principles.  
Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.  
Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public 
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency.  
The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to 
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the 
MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 & 4  
6. We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making 
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct 
the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to 
report to the General Council before the end of 2002. 
Marc-André Gagnon 
7. We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country members to provide 
incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage 
technology transfer to least-developed country members pursuant to Article 
66.2. We also agree that the least-developed country members will not be 
obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply 
Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce rights 
provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the 
right of least-developed country members to seek other extensions of the 
transition periods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. We 
instruct the Council for TRIPS to take the necessary action to give effect to this 
pursuant to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
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